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Naturalism, by Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro. William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2008. Pp. 132 $16.00 (paper)
MArk D. LINVILLe, Clayton State University
This volume appears in the “Interventions” series—“the product of the 
work carried out at the Center of Theology and Philosophy at the Uni-
versity of Nottingham.” Each book in the series promises consciously to 
address issues that appear at the interface between the two disciplines of 
philosophy and theology. Naturalism is no exception to this, as it considers 
philosophical critiques of both theism and naturalism and explores the 
contributions that theism might make to our understanding of freedom, 
consciousness, and value.
Goetz and Taliaferro (G&T) begin with the acknowledgement that there 
is no real consensus as to just what naturalism amounts to. (Someone in a 
hair salon spotted me with the title, and, judging from her initial, curious 
questions, assumed it to involve volleyball and sunbathing.) Alvin Plant-
inga has recently compared “naturalism” to “pornography”—you know 
what it is when you spot it, but it is very hard to define. Presumably, it 
is the view that, as C. S. Lewis once put it, “nature is the whole show”—
that reality is exhausted by “natural” phenomena and that the only good 
explanations of things are “naturalistic.” But this leaves us to determine 
what is meant by “nature.”
One virtue of the Goetz-Taliaferro book is their careful distinction be-
tween two general varieties of naturalism, “strict” and “broad.” While all 
naturalists will agree that “nature” exhausts reality and see this to entail 
a denial of the “supernatural” (chiefly, God and the soul), strict natural-
ists maintain, and broad naturalists deny, that “nature itself is whatever 
will be disclosed by the ideal natural sciences, especially physics” (p. 7). 
Arthur Danto apparently would have found Richard Lewontin’s warning, 
“We cannot allow a divine foot in the door,” too anemic. He described 
naturalism as “repudiating the view that there exists, or could exist, any 
entities or events which lie, in principle, beyond the scope of scientific ex-
planation” (p. 14), thus securing all possible doors against such intrusion.
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But G&T observe that there is no room for persons of any sort—divine 
or human—on strict naturalism. In chapter 1, “The Challenge of Strict 
Naturalism,” we find David Papineau suggesting that a complete physics 
would eclipse psychology in that all the facts there are, including puta-
tive psychological facts, are in principle describable in the language of 
physics (p. 15). Thus, G&T write, “Strict naturalism, as an ideal scientific 
philosophy, seeks to include all aspects of reality within a comprehensive 
and unified perspective that excludes anything that is either conscious, or 
psychological, or mental in nature” (p. 16). It is common knowledge that 
naturalists have no place for any sort of consciousness or teleology at the 
cosmic level: “Man is the product of causes that had no prevision of the 
end they were achieving,” Russell said. But the same would appear to 
be true of my decision to order a beer. There is no place for the irreduc-
ibly conscious or teleological on this view, and this much is acknowledged 
by its proponents. Thus, Daniel Dennett and Georges Rey insist that the 
conscious must be explained in terms of the non-conscious if it is to be 
explained at all. And our perception of ourselves as the purposive origina-
tors of our thoughts and deeds is an understandable mistake for “informa-
tion processing systems” such as us (p. 17).
Susan Blackmore seems to have taken this to heart. “I long ago conclud-
ed that there is no substantial or persistent self to be found in experience, 
let alone in the brain. I have become quite uncertain as to whether there 
really is anything it is like to be me” (p. 22). This has the ring of something 
confessed in confidence from a couch, but it would appear to be a corol-
lary of the strict naturalist’s agenda. The first person “what it is like to be 
me” perspective eludes the third person language of science.
In chapter 2 (“Strict Naturalism versus a Natural View of Persons”), 
G&T defend “a natural view of persons” as irreducibly conscious and te-
leological sources of action against influential arguments for reduction or 
elimination. In particular, the “argument from causal closure” comes to 
the fore, as presented by the likes of Jaegwon Kim. According to this argu-
ment, every physical event has a causally sufficient physical antecedent so 
that there is never room for an irreducibly mental cause to produce physi-
cal effects. Even if they were thought to exist, souls, like vice presidents, 
would be without any real influence in the world. Further, causal closure 
is an indispensable methodological commitment of the physical sciences, 
including the science of the brain.
G&T reply that the causal closure argument ultimately begs the ques-
tion against the dualist. Kim’s scientist must be committed to causal 
closure only if he is already committed to strict naturalism (p. 35). The 
authors observe the conditional or “iffy” nature of lawlike physical expla-
nation. We discover the dispositional nature of things—the “propensities 
of particles”—so that some set of physical causal antecedents C proves 
sufficient for some effect E. So we observe that if C obtains, then E will be 
observed, and we formulate laws with justified confidence. We might say 
that the link between C and E is causally closed. But this does not in itself 
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preclude a different set of causal antecedents C* that includes forces non-
physical in nature so that some relevantly different effect E* results. And 
perhaps E may be had by other means, including the irreducibly mental. 
To reject this possibility from the outset is, at the same time, to assume the 
truth of strict naturalism (p. 42).
As G&T observe, and as Kim has made clear in recent work, the argu-
ment from causal closure, if successful, precludes mental causation on any 
sort of view that holds out for the irreducibly mental (p. 30). That is, it is 
just as effective against currently popular versions of property dualism 
(G&T’s “broad naturalism”) as it is against substance dualism, so that the 
resulting view is an implausible form of epiphenomenalism. In fact, it is 
difficult to see how the naturalist of any sort—strict or broad—is in a po-
sition to deny causal closure. The property dualist must insist that men-
tal properties supervene upon physical properties. But if there is causal 
closure at the physical level, and the instantiation of the base properties 
is sufficient for that of supervenient properties, then epiphenomenalism 
seems unavoidable. Kim thus argues that mental causation may be pre-
served only if some program of reduction is successful. But, he adds, can-
didly, “reductionism may not be true.”
G&T press the case against reduction. They cite McGinn. “You can stare 
into a living, conscious brain . . . but you will not thereby see what the 
subject is experiencing, the conscious state itself” (p. 32). Michael Lock-
wood confesses that the language of physics or other relevant sciences, 
once sanitized of all explicit references to mental properties or events, is 
not even “remotely capable of capturing what is distinctive about con-
sciousness.” He adds that, were it not for a prior “deep-seated conviction” 
that current physical science “has essentially got reality taped,” the reduc-
tionist programmes on offer would not be given any serious consideration 
(pp. 32–33). As G&T observe, in the case of other identifications involving 
natural kinds, such as water=H2O, to understand the microstructure is to 
grasp the phenomenon itself. Not so in the case of the putative identity 
of, say, pain and the firing of C-fibers. Later in the chapter, G&T urge 
that, whereas the physical structure involved in an experience of pain is 
essentially compositional in nature, the intrinsic nature of pain itself is 
essentially simple, and this difference alone is enough to foil an identity 
claim (p. 49).
Kim has recently urged a “functional identity” of a limited class of 
cognitive properties (e.g., “To be in pain, by definition, is to be in a state 
which is caused by tissue damage and which in turn causes winces and 
groans”). But he suggests that qualia, such as what it is like to be in pain, re-
sist such a functional reduction. But this entails eliminativism with regard 
to the seeming intrinsic nature of such experiences, and the fortunes of 
such a proposal would seem to depend upon the plausibility of the sug-
gestion that there is really nothing that it is like to be in pain—what G&T 
call the “ouchiness” of pain. But isn’t there more to pain (and to Susan 
Blackmore)—something that it is like to be in pain (or to be Blackmore)—
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than a system of inputs and outputs? I, for one, think that there is some-
thing that it is like to be astonished at assertions to the contrary.
Chapter 3, “Naturalism and the Soul,” is given to a defense of substance 
dualism against some rather forceful objections. In particular, G&T en-
tertain an argument by Sosa, who argues that causal relations supervene 
upon certain non-causal conditions, and these include spatial relations. 
Cartesian dualists conceive of minds as essentially immaterial and non-
spatial. And so, Cartesian minds cannot be spatially related to physical 
bodies and thus cannot causally interact with those bodies.
G&T counter by observing that Sosa’s view assumes that causal prop-
erties are possessed extrinsically, supervening as they do upon more ba-
sic non-causal and spatial properties. Indeed, this assumption parallels 
a similar view that numerical identity is derivative of more basic spatial 
relations. To this one may reply that, on the contrary, identity is intrinsic 
and ontologically more basic than such relations. Similarly, G&T urge that 
causal properties should be viewed as intrinsic to the agent. “The power of 
an agent and the capacity of a patient are ontologically irreducible and in-
trinsic causal features of those objects. They are not derivative properties” 
(p. 60). Of course, though causal properties may be intrinsic, causal rela-
tions may themselves be dependent upon various non-causal conditions, 
but it is not obvious that those conditions must include spatial relations.
G&T think this latter conclusion stands despite Kim’s argument for spa-
tial relations as necessary conditions. Kim argues, in effect, that any two 
intrinsically indiscernible objects must also be indiscernible with regard to 
their causal powers (because those powers are plausibly thought to be ei-
ther identical to or supervenient upon the intrinsic properties). However, 
it is possible for them to exercise those powers differently. The difference 
must therefore be accounted for by appeal to differences in their extrinsic 
properties or relations, and spatial relations fit the bill nicely (p. 63).
G&T reply, “It seems as if the fundamental issue is whether it is pos-
sible for a nonspatial object to exist.” They add that “if it is possible for it 
to exist, then it is not obvious in strictly a priori or conceptual terms that it 
cannot interact causally with an object located in space” (p. 63).
It is not immediately clear to me that this is, in fact, the fundamental 
issue. Kim is concerned with discernibility, but the argument is not that, 
apart from discernible spatial relations, intrinsic indiscernibility entails 
numerical identity. As G&T have already suggested, identity is ontologi-
cally prior to spatial relations. (If one were to ask regarding two intrinsi-
cally indiscernible and non-spatial objects, A and B, “In virtue of what are 
A and B distinct?” the correct answer is “In virtue of their distinctness.”) 
Rather, Kim seeks “a principled way of distinguishing intrinsically indis-
cernible objects in causal situations” (emphasis added).
Kim’s worries seem not to be limited to a principled distinction among 
objects. Suppose that, at t, I am contemplating Jaegwon Kim, but then, at 
t1, I have thoughts of Kim Basinger. I have undergone no changes among 
my intrinsic properties, so they are indiscernible between t and t1, and the 
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same is true of my corresponding powers and potentials. How have I man-
aged this feat? What explains this difference in the exercise of my powers? 
To suppose that the differences must be analyzed into differences in reci-
pes consisting of intrinsic and extrinsic properties and relations (so that 
any two objects that are indiscernible with regard to all of these will also be 
behaviorally indiscernible), is just to beg the question against the libertar-
ian appeal to irreducibly teleological explanations. To insist, further, that 
the differences must be spatial or compositional in nature is to commit a 
similar offense against the Cartesian dualist, not to mention the theist.
However all of this may be, the following proposition—an immaterial 
and nonspatial thing, A, produced an effect in B, which is material—is not obvi-
ously a contradiction nor would it seem to entail one. And so G&T appear 
to be correct in noting that there is no obvious a priori reason for ruling it 
out. As they confess at the close of the chapter, the mind-body connection 
remains mysterious according to dualism, but perhaps the mystery is sim-
ply a function of the fact that the connection is brute and thus, in principle, 
admits of no further analysis. As they observe, brute connections seem 
unavoidable on physicalism as well. G. K. Chesterton noted that everyone 
knows that pumpkins always produce pumpkins. “What nobody knows 
is why they should not produce elephants and giraffes.” We might sup-
pose that, in Chesterton’s day, pumpkins were “black boxes,” so to speak. 
We have since cracked the pumpkin genome and understand that pump-
kin helices are programmed to reproduce after their kind. Of course, this 
involves connections that either are or are not open to further analysis. 
We may proceed for a time opening boxes within boxes, but on an ideal 
natural science, there is a fundamental level of explanation at which the 
answer to the question “Why is β always occasioned by α?” is “It just is.” 
The appeal, then, is to intrinsic causal powers possessed by microparticles. 
G&T ask, “If this is not a deeply vexing mystery for physical causation, it 
should not be one for non-physical causation” (p. 70).
G&T devote a portion of chapter 3 to a discussion of “non-Cartesian 
dualism” under the heading “Why Not Locate Souls in Space?” Most of 
what they have to say here is in dialogue with Kim’s critique of such a 
proposal, and so one is left to piece the view together out of inferences 
from that exchange. The basic suggestion is that souls may be conceived 
as being “located in the same spatial framework” as bodies. After all, it 
seems that the conscious part of me is found wherever my body is, so if I 
am otherwise convinced of dualism, this may seem a natural view. Thus, 
souls have spatial properties, but are immaterial and, presumably, unex-
tended—on the order of geometric points. The basic soul-body “pairing 
account” is thus one of spatial contiguity rather than causation. The view 
apparently has some affinity to the Jain view of the soul or jiva, which lit-
erally occupies the body and fills it as light fills a room.
Chapter 4, “Naturalism, Consciousness and Values,” assesses “broad 
naturalism” in its attempt at preserving “consciousness and values with-
in a fundamentally physicalist or materialist naturalism” (p. 71). Kim 
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observes that this sort of “minimal physicalism” is “seductive” but also 
“a piece of wishful thinking.” As we have already noted, Kim urges an 
argument from causal closure (“The Supervenience/Exclusion Argu-
ment”) that reduces property dualism to epiphenomenalism. G&T con-
sider “The Problem of Emergence,” which arises out of considerations 
of both the striking difference between conscious states and the physical 
processes from which they are said to emerge and the contingency of 
the relationship between them. The broad naturalist resists the reduction 
of the mental to the physical, but is committed to the supervenience of 
the former upon the latter. Minimally, this requires that certain sets of 
physical properties or combinations of physical phenomena are sufficient 
for mental properties or conscious phenomena. But it seems possible for 
the physical properties to be instantiated without their attendant mental 
properties. Searle suggests that thought experiments that purport to dis-
cover worlds that are physically indiscernible from the actual world but 
are devoid of conscious phenomena involve a form of “cheating” (p. 77). 
Of course, if we already know that mental properties just are constituted 
by physical properties and thus supervenient in this way, then we must 
agree. But this is precisely the point in dispute, and apart from such a 
stipulation such worlds appear to be conceivable. (Similarly, if Hitler is 
depraved, and his depravity is constituted by some combination of his 
natural properties, then there is no possible world in which someone is 
naturally indiscernible from Hitler but is not depraved. But this observa-
tion alone will hardly satisfy the moral skeptic who wonders why we 
should think that moral properties like depravity exist in the first place.)
Chapter 4 also includes an assessment of broad naturalist attempts at 
preserving objective values. G&T begin by noting that the most common 
naturalist account of values “appeals to the concept of evolution” (p. 86). 
This is followed immediately by a consideration of the views of Michael 
Ruse and Edward Wilson who have maintained that our sense of moral 
obligation is “an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes in order to get us 
to cooperate.” Their discussion also takes in the likes of Richard Dawk-
ins and Darwin himself. One might have expected here a discussion of 
various contemporary ethical naturalists, such as the so-called “Cornell 
Realists,” who have argued that moral properties are either identical to 
or supervenient upon natural properties. I, for one, think that the natural-
ist’s commitment to evolutionary theory poses an undercutting defeater 
for our moral beliefs in general, but such an argument meets some stiff 
resistance from ethical naturalists, who would likely agree with Daniel 
Dennett that Ruse and Wilson are guilty of “greedy reductionism” in their 
assumption that the explanation for human morality is essentially genetic 
in nature. With Philip Kitcher, they might suggest that evolution has sim-
ply equipped us with the rational faculties necessary for moral discovery.
The final chapter, “Beyond Naturalism,” is given to a defense of the 
coherence of theism against a variety of naturalist critiques. Not the least 
of these is the suggestion that the very notion of an immaterial conscious 
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mind that interacts with the created cosmos is incoherent. G&T assess such 
critiques and argue persuasively that the charges of incoherence are either 
just overstated (as no problems of a strictly logical nature are evident) or 
involve an illicit assumption of naturalist or physicalist tenets.
An appendix to the volume briefly develops and defends the so-called 
“Argument From Reason”—a perhaps more rigorous heir of the argument 
presented by C. S. Lewis and others—with the conclusion that naturalism 
is ultimately self-defeating since the view has implications that would un-
dermine the very arguments that might otherwise support it.
Overall, Goetz and Taliaferro have managed to explain and assess 
naturalism in a way that is at once concise, careful, and clear. I know of 
no other work engaging metaphysical naturalism that matches this one 
for these virtues. They allow leading naturalists to speak for themselves, 
sometimes at length, but mere “cut-and-paste” is avoided by skillful edit-
ing and lively interaction with the views discussed. The result is that the 
reader is likely to come away with a better understanding of the world-
view itself as well as the most significant difficulties that confront it. And 
the book is a model of careful philosophical argumentation and world-
view assessment. It should appeal to a wide audience that includes pro-
fessional philosophers, undergraduates and graduate students, seminar-
ians, pastors, and interested laypersons. And it should serve as a fine text 
for a number of courses, including introduction to philosophy, philosophy 
of religion, and apologetics. I have, for many years, taught a course titled 
Major Worldviews, which features naturalism and theism, among other 
views. This book should become a staple for such a course.
essays in the Philosophy of religion, by Philip L. Quinn. Edited by Christian 
Miller. Clarendon Press, 2006. Pp. 315. $49.95 (paper)
keVIN Meeker, University of South Alabama
This posthumously published collection of essays is the best of books and 
the worst of books. It is the best of books: Philip L. Quinn’s influential and 
thought-provoking essays provide a scintillating tour de force of some 
of the most important topics in philosophy of religion in the past four 
decades. It is the worst of books: It hauntingly reminds us that he is no 
longer with us to help us think through these important issues. Despite 
reminding us of our loss, this volume furnishes us with a golden opportu-
nity to consider the breadth and depth of Quinn’s omnifarious interests in 
the philosophy of religion.
The book begins with a memorably poignant foreword by Eleonore 
Stump. Editor Christian B. Miller, a former Quinn student, next offers a 
fine survey of Quinn’s life and work as well as the essays in the volume. 
The book reprints fourteen essays, divided into six sections that provide 
